United Nations Food Systems Summit 2021
Scientific Group Scientific Group
https://sc-fss2021.org/

Food Systems Summit Brief
Prepared by Research Partners of the Scientific Group for the Food Systems Summit
April, 2021

Addressing Food Crises in Violent Conflicts

by Birgit Kemmerling, Conrad Schetter, Lars Wirkus

Summary

Food insecurity and hunger continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. Many of today's food crises are linked to violent conflicts in various ways. The number of people affected by conflict-driven food crises increased from 74 million in 2018 to more than 77 million one year later—particularly in north-eastern Nigeria, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen. The achievement of food security ending hunger and malnutrition and enabling sustainable agriculture production as addressed by Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 2 'Zero Hunger' depends therefore largely on progress made on SDG 16 in promoting peaceful and inclusive societies.

However, the severe food crises in the past decade have demonstrated the weaknesses to govern food (in)security in conflict settings. While national governments or belligerents are often unable or unwilling to respond adequately to food crises, humanitarian relief operations face the challenges of reaching those people most in need of food supply and simultaneously avoiding exacerbating the conflict. This has left many of the affected communities having to find their own responses to food insecurity. If food crises are to be effectively addressed, research and policy actions need to tackle both food crises and violent conflict.

Recommendations

- **Respect access to food as a human right:** Any policy action needs to be based on the common understanding that access to food is a human right. Providing safe, continued and sufficient access to food is, foremost, the respective government's role. Every government should pursue preventive policies and take emergency measures to secure food equally for all parts of its population. If a government lacks the capacity to prevent or mitigate a food crisis, it should allow and facilitate relief operations as demanded by humanitarian law. Any government or warring faction that prohibits parts of the population from access to food needs to be sanctioned.
- **Build a bridge between humanitarian assistance, development and peacebuilding:** Food assistance, if implemented well, plays a key role in mitigating the devastating effects of conflicts and in contributing to peace. While short-term assistance needs to be based on sound conflict analysis and a better understanding of the structural factors which determine vulnerabilities, long-term food assistance should actively integrate peacebuilding approaches. In line with current debates of the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus, improving food security needs greater cooperation and coordination between actors in humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peacebuilding.
- **Integrate local capacities:** Conflict-affected populations adopt multiple strategies to secure food, and these depend on a multitude of factors such as the conflict context, intensity, and duration, an individual's situation, access to resources and support and governance. Local response mechanisms and capacities to food crises and conflict need to be better understood and best practices integrated into relief operations and national response strategies.
- **Improve the data situation and links to early action in conflict settings**: While early warning systems for famine have advanced over the past decades, challenges remain in accessing data in conflict settings and linking them to early action. The development of an integrated platform combining early warning systems for famine and violent conflict could add important data and the missing link to assess famine, drought and conflict risk more comprehensively while advancing anticipatory humanitarian action in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

1. Introduction

Food insecurity remains one of the greatest global challenges. Since 2014, the number of people affected by hunger worldwide has been rising again: In 2019, almost 750 million people were exposed to extreme food insecurity (FAO et al., 2020), out of whom almost 135 million people in 55 countries or territories were classified to be in crisis conditions or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Violent conflicts undoubtedly play a decisive role in current food crises. In 2019, more than 77 million people in 22 countries were affected by conflict-driven food crises (FSIN, 2020). In addition, it is worth to mention, that violent conflicts have severe short and long-term impacts on the nutrition status of children .[1]

Food insecurity and violent conflicts are mostly found in regions with a high degree of fragility. Africa is still most affected by food crises: 54 per cent of the population globally facing food crises or worse

[1] Studies in different contexts find evidence that conflict-affected children are shorter than children born in regions not affected by conflict. Moreover, negative effects on child weight at birth were observed if the mother was exposed to conflict during pregnancy. Physical and cognitive impacts have also been found in adults who were exposed to conflict in their early years (Brück et al., 2016).

(IPC/CH Phase 3 or higher[2]) are located in Africa (Fig.1). In East Africa, particularly in South Sudan, armed conflicts, violent extremism, inter-communal violence and other localised tensions mainly affect peace and security. Further conflict-driven food crises emerged in two other African regions: the Lake Chad Basin—comprising the borderlands of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and northern Nigeria—and the Central Sahel, affecting Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (FSIN, 2020). In both areas, insecurity and jihadist groups' expansionist aspirations have led to massive violent incidents and displacement of populations, destruction or closure of basic social services, disruption or permanent breakdown of productive activities, markets and trade flows. In Asia and the Middle East region, 40 million people are affected by conflict-driven food crises, especially Yemen, Afghanistan, and Syrian Arab Republic, where political, social and economic grievances or geopolitical tensions have sparked protracted violent and armed conflicts (FSIN, 2020).

This *briefing paper* looks at the multiple dimensions between current food crises and violent conflicts and identifies four key areas for a comprehensive response that addresses food insecurity and violent conflict.

[2] IPC/CH Phase: Integrated Phase Classification is a standardised classification system to describe the anticipated severity of food emergencies / food insecurity according to a five-phase scale: minimal, stressed, crisis, emergency, famine. (https://fews.net/IPC)



Figure 1: *Food insecurity, violent conflicts and fragility in Africa 2015–2021.*

2. Multiple dimensions of food crises and violent conflicts

Over the past decade, a growing body of research has examined the mutual impact between violent conflicts and food insecurity (for an overview, see Brück et al., 2016; Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019) and indicated strong correlations on multiple layers. However, food insecurity, as well as violent conflicts, are characterised by a high degree of complexity and contextualisation. Thus, discussions about the state of food insecurity and the typology of violent conflicts tend to become objectives in themselves. Criteria for determining the state of food insecurity are usually based on the four dimensions of availability, access, stability and utilisation and encompass a range of variables covering different sectors such as health, food prices and agricultural production. Analyses of food security range from the individual to the global level, and are classified by severity (FSIN, 2020).

Typologies of violent conflict differentiate between the duration and intensity of violent conflicts, between root causes, key drivers, or ways of mobilisation as well as between domestic, regional and inter-state constellations (for an overview, see Demmers, 2016).[3] Each of these typologies entails a certain interpretation of violent conflicts. However, a categorisation of violent conflicts which centres on food (in)security is missing so far. To narrow this gap, we will link the logics of war to food (in)security. We will identify three dimensions of how violent conflicts have an impact on food (in)security.

2.1 Destruction and food insecurity

The general principle of violent conflicts is that belligerent parties aim to harm, defeat or even eliminate their 'enemy'. Consequently, the emergence of frontlines, battlefields and war zones is an inevitable effect of violent conflicts, even if the current technological upgrading of modern armies and warfare (e.g. drones) aims to increase the accuracy of military attacks (Prinz & Schetter, 2017). This is why by and large, violent interactions go hand in hand with physical destruction, affecting people's vulnerabilities in various ways.

In general, Collier (1999) finds that the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita declines at an annual rate of 2.2 per cent during civil wars.

Since in many of today's conflict-affected countries, the majority of people depend on small-scale farming to provide food and income for their households, small-scale agriculture is particularly affected: The destruction (e.g. bombing) or contamination (e.g. land mines, chemical weapons) of agricultural areas, as well as infrastructure (irrigation networks, roads, bridges, buildings, etc.), might force farmers to abandon agriculture altogether. Farmers may also no longer be able to cultivate their fields for lack of access to seeds and fertiliser, credits and capital, due to the uncertainty of access to buyers and markets and the displacement or killing of people (Baumann & Kuemmerle, 2016).

Especially when the expansion of war zones provokes forced migration on a large scale, the impacts on food security are direct and severe—not only in the short term but often also in the long term. Forced migration not only leads to the collapse of agricultural production and infrastructure but also disrupts or interrupts local and regional supply chains and increases food prices on local markets. At the same time, displaced people have to give up their livelihoods as producers of food (farmers, pastoralists etc.) and are thus exposed to food insecurity themselves (Brück et al., 2016), especially if they become dependent on food aid from humanitarian organisations and cannot restart agricultural activities.

The rehabilitation of war zones for food production and food supply takes decades. Clearing battlefields (de-mining), re-building physical infrastructure and establishing operational governance

[3] The question of when a violent conflict can be labelled as 'war' is still ongoing. Its definition in International Law (declaration of war) diverges from the one in Peace and Conflict Studies (e.g. number of causalities).

structures is costly and takes time. Moreover, such phases of post-war reconstruction are overshadowed by fierce disputes over access to and ownership of land and water, as property rights often change hands in times of war (Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016). Thus, food insecurity, for poor populations in particular, often persist beyond the end of a violent conflict.

2.2 Food (in)security and warring factions

Food supply is of strategic importance to any armed group—from large-scale armies to vigilant gangs (Justino & Stojetz, 2016). This is why armed groups' presence and rule directly impact local food security and the control of production areas. Historically, the supply of large armies with food went hand in hand with the plundering of food storages and the looting of civilian households and markets. Although looting is still a common strategy, the links between armed groups' presence and food security are more complex: Armed groups might show a strong interest in local food production and other goods. Combatants can take direct control over agricultural resources and livestock for sustenance or levy taxes on these products. For example, in Syria and Iraq, the agrarian zones seized by Islamic State were maintained to a large extend, despite massive forced displacement (Eklund et al., 2017).

People in conflict-affected contexts also adjust their practices to changing politics and (local) political actors. To protect their livelihoods and food security, people might (voluntarily or coerced) cooperate with armed groups (Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019). On the one hand, individuals participate in and support armed groups because they may benefit from the conflict through improved economic opportunities, such as access to food, looting and appropriation of agricultural land or livestock (Keen, 1998). On the other, people, such as farmers in agricultural off-seasons, might be recruited as part-time fighters.

2.3 Hunger as a weapon

When violent conflicts are directed against certain social segments, food insecurity can become "a weapon of war" (Messer & Cohen, 2015)—either as a direct strategy or as a by-product. The goal is either to deprive a particular warring party of the population's support or to eliminate entire population groups (ethnic cleansing, genocide). Direct strategies include cutting off food supplies to harm hostile armies and the population supporting them (De Waal, 2018). Similarly, blocking food access and destroying food infrastructure ("scorched earth") are calculated military techniques not only to ignite mass starvation, malnutrition and hunger among the population but also to foster forced migration. Although the number of victims of mass starvation has declined in the past decades, it is still a widely-used military strategy in ongoing conflict zones such as Yemen, Syria, South Sudan or the Central African Republic.

Strategies may also include preventing humanitarian access. In recent food crises, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Islamic State in Syria or commanders in South Sudan refused aid from humanitarian agencies. Governments themselves often violate the humanitarian principle and reject international relief operations, especially if they form part of the conflict, as could be witnessed in Syria and Yemen. The bypassing of humanitarian principle can also extend to donor governments; one reason for the delayed response to the food crisis in Somalia in 2011 was the US anti-terrorist legislation, which made it difficult for humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to areas controlled by Al-Shabaab (De Waal, 2018).

We have shown how the three interrelated dimensions of war logics—destruction, rule of armed groups and hunger as a weapon—have multiple effects on people's food insecurity. However, other factors, such as (conflict-related) increases in food and seed prices as well as (changing) climatic conditions, often amplify the exposure to conflict and food insecurity (Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2019).

In many of today's conflict-affected countries, smallholder farmers, who are already vulnerable in the absence of conflicts (natural hazards) present a large part of the population. Conflict is an additional 'shock' that affects these populations' livelihoods and well-being (Brück et al, 2016). In times of war, natural hazards affect the population much harder and increase the difficulty of access to food dramatically. As the most severe natural hazards, droughts exacerbate the effect of food (in)security. Droughts as 'creeping' or slow-onset disasters usually affect larger land areas than other types of disasters and make mitigation and adaptation strategies difficult to implement. Many of the adverse effects of drought often accumulate slowly and may persist for years after the event has ended (Wirkus & Piereder, 2019).

What is less clear is whether food insecurity in turn sparks, intensifies or perpetuates conflict. While food insecurity alone is not likely to cause violent conflicts, it can increase social grievances in combination with socio-economic and political inequalities. These exclude parts of the population (particularly youth) from economic activities and participation in political decision-making processes, which ultimately can fuel civil unrest or conflicts (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011; Vestby et al., 2018). Besides structural conditions, rising food prices have been found to exacerbate the risk of political unrest and conflicts, particularly in urban settings. The dominant explanation for the vicious circle of price and violent conflict are consumer grievances: Higher prices create or increase economic constraints and/or sentiments of (perceived) relative deprivation, which activate grievances that, in turn, can lead to conflict (whereas conflict is likely to increase food prices again) (Raleigh et al., 2015). These grievances can be directed against the state if it fails to secure food for the population in the face of rising global food prices. In Africa, rising food prices and unrest were associated with more political repression (Berazneva & Lee, 2013).

3. Addressing food crises and violent conflict

The complex relationships between food crises and violent conflicts require comprehensive and adapted policy actions. These actions must refer to the reduction of food insecurity as an effect of violent conflict and consider the reduction of violent conflict or conflict risks itself. We thus suggest four key areas for a multi-faceted response that addresses food insecurity and violent conflict.

3.1 Respect access to food as a human right during violent conflict

Access to food is a human right. Any government should pursue preventive policies and take emergency measures to secure food equally for all parts of its population. If a government lacks the capacity to prevent or mitigate a food crisis, it should allow and facilitate relief operations as demanded by humanitarian law (Akande & Gillard, 2019). However, national governments or belligerents are often unable or unwilling to respond adequately to food crises. At the same time, international relief operations face the challenges of reaching the people most in need and of avoiding exacerbating the conflict.

Therefore, all actors must comply with the provisions to protect the population from intended starvation and with humanitarian principles to guarantee humanitarian access. Any government or warring faction that prohibits parts of the population from access to food needs to be sanctioned. UN Security Council Resolution 2417 is a major step in this direction. The Resolution stresses the importance of compliance by belligerents with international humanitarian law and condemns the denial of humanitarian access to affected civilians (UNSC, 2018). Most importantly, the Resolution stipulates that the obstruction of humanitarian access in conflict settings can result in targeted sanctions, as already used, for example, for Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Akande & Gillard, 2019). Thus, the resolution has the potential to be used by UN agencies to monitor and report robustly on human-

induced food crises in conflicts and to call on the Security Council and the international community to act (Zappalà, 2019).

3.2 Build bridges between humanitarian action, development and peacebuilding

The genuine role of international relief operations in food crises is to prevent or alleviate human suffering induced by disasters and conflicts. Short-term food assistance during violent conflicts usually focuses on improving food consumption of conflict-affected people and communities. It also aims to support the most vulnerable, such as displaced persons, children, pregnant and nursing women. However, relief operations in conflict settings often face challenges in guaranteeing aid workers' safety and security, gaining necessary data of affected populations and reaching those people most in need in a timely and appropriate manner (see, for example, Tranchant et al., 2019). At the same time, food interventions risk becoming a source of conflict themselves, primarily because of an inadequate understanding of the conflict setting (Devereux, 2000). The misappropriation of food aid in particular, such as the usurpation of food by violent actors, can fuel political grievances and perpetuate conflict. Moreover, food aid can undermine local food production and markets and affect the development of local capacity (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013). A clear and locally informed analysis of the conflict and its context as well as increased equity and accountability is needed to prevent negative impacts of food aid in conflict environments.

While short-term food aid focuses primarily on alleviating human suffering rather than resolving violent conflict, long-term humanitarian assistance, as provided particularly in protracted crises or post-conflict situations, can identify potential conflicts and address them, reducing the risk of conflict flare-ups. Usually, these interventions have a stronger impact than the immediate supply of food (or cash/vouchers) and already include development assistance measures. Long-term food assistance can, therefore, play a crucial role in building local capacity, restoring agricultural production and, ultimately, consolidating peace. However, it is crucial to initiate its provision early enough and to consider the amounts needed. It is also vital that it reaches the people who need it most, such as IDPs, host communities and returnees (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013; Lander & Richards, 2019). Nevertheless, aid agencies need to be aware that the longer food aid is provided, the more it has a direct impact on the local food market and price trends. Therefore, nuanced planning and management are required to avoid affecting smallholders' livelihoods by flooding them with aid.

To effectively address these challenges, long-term food assistance needs to bridge humanitarian action, development intervention and peacebuilding. Thus, food assistance is a key instrument addressed in current debates of the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus, which calls for greater cooperation and coordination among actors in humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peacebuilding.

3.3 Integrate local capacities

Conflict-affected populations adopt very different strategies to secure food. These strategies depend on multiple factors such as the conflict context, intensity and duration, the individual situation, access to resources and support, and governance. For example, rather than aiming to maximise agricultural profits, farmers may change their crop production to a low-risk, low-return strategy by switching their production from cash crops to less profitable crops as these crops provide food for subsistence or can be easily transferred in case of displacement. However, maintaining these low-risk-low-return strategies after conflicts end affects their recovery and can further affect their livelihood in the long run (Arias et al., 2017).

Similarly, pastoralists may adapt livestock production to the conflict, e.g. by selling livestock to have sufficient cash or hiding livestock from armed groups or local ruling groups (Brück et al, 2016). Also,

studies have shown that households increase their use of safety nets to minimise uncertainty. Support ranges from cash transfers to in-kind assistance received by the household (Brück & d'Errico, 2019). Remittances are also an important safety net in responding to food crises and conflict but still much needs to be learned about its role for affected people (Haan et al., 2012). Therefore, local response mechanisms to food crises and conflicts need to be better understood and successfull practices incorporated into relief efforts and national response strategies while, at the same time, striving to avoid potential harm.

3.4 Improve the data situation and better link different data sets with early action

Early warning mechanisms for famine such as FEWS NET have advanced over the last 35 years towards better predicting and managing food crises. They provide decision-makers and relief organisations with a rigorous, evidence- and consensus-based analysis of food insecurity and acute malnutrition situations. However, several challenges remain: First, in violent conflicts, access to data needed for comprehensive analysis and timely warning is often restricted. Second, the announcement of a food emergency is highly political and often challenged by claims of sovereignty (Lander & Richards, 2019). Third, even if warnings are timely and allow careful planning, adequate finance mechanisms are often not in place. Recent developments in anticipatory action, such as FAO's Early Warning Early Action or ICRC's forecast-based financing approach, aim to close the gap between forecasting tools and delayed response but still face multiple challenges in adjusting these to food crises and conflict (Wagner & Jaime, 2020). Forth, a knowledge gap still exists between data that is available to assess the food security situation and data on conflict early warning. Conflict early warning and forecasting systems such as UCDP ViEWS, ACLED Pulse) address this knowledge dilemma. They have the potential to close the "conflict assessment gap" of current food crisis warning systems (Wirkus & Piereder, 2019).

An integrated platform developed to combine early warning data sets for famines and violent conflicts could provide a better basis for a more comprehensive assessment of famine, drought and conflict risk and advance anticipatory humanitarian action in fragile and conflict-affected settings.

Taking into account these four key areas could help national governments and international humanitarian and development organisations to take effective preventive, anticipatory and emergency action against food crises during violent conflict, while at the same time integrating peacebuilding approaches into long-term food interventions to address hunger and conflict.

4. References

Akande, D. & Gillard, E. (2019). *Conflict-induced food insecurity and the war crime of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare: The underlying rules of International Humanitarian Law*. BSG Working Paper 2019/030. Accessed at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/publications/conflict-induced-food-insecurity-and-war-crime-starvation-civilians-method

Arias, M. A., Ibáñez, A. M., & Zambrano, A. (2017). *Agricultural production amid conflict: Separating the effects of conflict into shocks and uncertainty*. HiCN Working Paper 245.

Baumann, M. & Kuemmerle, T. (2016). The impacts of warfare and armed conflict on land systems. *Journal of Land Use Science 11,* 672-688. https://doi.org/10.1080/1747423X.2016.1241317

Berazneva, J., & Lee, D. R. (2013). Explaining the African food riots of 2007-2008: An empirical analysis. *Food Policy 39*, 28–39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2012.12.007

Brinkman, H. J., & Hendrix, C. S. (2011). *Food insecurity and violent conflict: Causes, consequences, and addressing the challenges*. Occasional Paper no. 24. Accessed at https://www.wfp.org/publications/occasional-paper-24-food-insecurity-and-violent-conflict-causes-consequences-and-addressing-

Brück, T., Habibi, N., Martin-Shields, C., Sneyers, A., Stojetz, W., & van Weezel, S., (2016). *The relationship between food security and violent conflict.* Report to the Food and Agriculture Organization. Final Report to FAO. Accessed at https://isdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Food-Security-and-Conflict-2016-12-22.pdf

Brück, T., d'Errico, M., & Pietrelli, R. (2019). The effects of violent conflict on household resilience and food security: Evidence from the 2014 Gaza conflict. *World Development 119*, 150-164.

Collier, P. (1999). *On the economic consequences of civil war.* Oxford Economic Papers 51.

De Waal, A. (2018). The end of famine? Prospects for the elimination of mass starvation by political action. *Political Geography 62*, 184-195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.09.004

Demmers, J. (2016). *Theories of violent conflict: An introduction*. London: Routledge.

Devereux, S. (2000). *Famine in the twentieth century*. IDS working papers issue 105.

Eklund, L., Degerald, M., Brandt, M., Prishchepov, A.V., & Pilesjö, P. (2017). How conflict affects land use: agricultural activity in areas seized by the Islamic State. *Environmental Research Letters, 12*(5), 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/aa673a

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO. (2020). *The state of food security and nutrition in the world 2020. Transforming food systems for affordable healthy diets*. Rome, FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9692en

FSIN. (2020). *Global report on food crises. Joint analysis for better decisions*. Accessed at https://www.wfp.org/publications/2020-global-report-food-crises

Haan, N., Devereux, S., & Maxwell, D. (2012). Global implications of Somalia 2011 for famine prevention, mitigation and response. *Global Food Security 1*(1), 74-79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2012.09.003

Hendrix, C. & Brinkman, H. (2013). Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex Feedbacks. *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 2*(2), 1-18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.bm

Justino, P. & Stojetz, W. (2018). *On the legacies of wartime governance* (HiCN Working Paper 263).

Keen, David. (1998). *The economic functions of violence in civil wars.* Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Lander, B. & Richards, R. V. (2019). Addressing hunger and starvation in situations of armed conflict – Laying the foundations for peace. *Journal of International Criminal Justice 17*(4), 675-698. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqz055

Martin-Shields, C. P., & Stojetz, W. (2019). Food security and conflict: Empirical challenges and future opportunities for researchand policy making on food security and conflict. *World Development 119*, 150-164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.07.011

Messer, E. & Cohen M. J. (2015). Breaking the links between conflict and hunger redux. Special Issue: *Global Food Security and Health, 7*(3), 211-233. https://doi.org/10.1002/wmh3.147

Prinz, J., & Schetter, C. (2017). Conditioned sovereignty: The creation and legitimation of spaces of violence in counterterrorism operations of the "war on terror". *Alternatives*, *41*(3), 119-136.

Raleigh, C., Choi, H. J. & Kniveton, C. (2015). The devil is in the details: An investigation of the relationships between conflict, food price and climate across Africa. *Global Environmental Change 32*, 187-199, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.03.005

Tranchant, J. P., Gelli, A., Bliznashka, L., Diallo, A. S., Sacko, M., Assima, A., Siegel, E. H., Aurino, E., & Masset, E. (2019). The impact of food assistance on food insecure populations during conflict: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Mali. *World Development 119*, 185-202. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.01.027

UNSC (2018). Security Council resolution 2417 (2018) [on conflict-induced food insecurity] / adopted by the Security Council at its 8267th meeting, on 24 May 2018. Accessed at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1627380?ln=en

Van Leeuwen, M. & Van Der Haar, G. (2016). Theorizing the land–violent conflict nexus. *World Development, 78*, 94-104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.011

Vestby, J., Rudolfsen, I., & Buhaug, H. (2018). *Does hunger cause conflict?* Peace Research Institute Oslo – Climate & Conflict, 18 May 2018. Accessed at https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/

Wagner, M. & Jaime, C. (2020). *An agenda for expanding forecast-based action to situations of conflict.* GPPi Working Paper. Accessed at https://www.gppi.net/media/Wagner_Jaime_2020_Forecast-Based-Action-in-Conflicts.pdf

Wirkus, L., & Piereder, J. (2019). Early warning systems for drought and violent conflict – toward potential cross-pollination. In E. Mapedza, D. Tsegai, M. Bruntrup, & R. Mcleman (Eds.), *Drought challenges: Policy options for developing countries* (pp. 165-181). Current directions in water scarcity research, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Zappalà, S. (2019). Conflict Related Hunger, 'Starvation Crimes' and UN Security Council Resolution 2417 (2018). Journal of International Criminal Justice 17(4), 881-906. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqz047

A Policy Briefing for the United Nations Food Systems Summit Scientific Group by the Association of Academies and Societies of Sciences in Asia.

The authors are:

Birgit Kemmerling, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

Conrad Schetter, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

Lars Wirkus, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

For further information about the Scientific Group,
visit **https://sc-fss2021.org** or
contact **info@sc-fss2021.org**
@sc_fss2021